The project to replace 46 fire and rescue services control rooms with nine regional control centres took on "a life of its own" and has been a comprehensive failure with at least £469 million wasted, according to the National Audit Office.

In a new report, it says the FireControl project was flawed at the outset because it did not have the support of local fire and rescue services. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) tried to impose a national control system without having sufficient mandatory powers and without properly consulting with fire and rescue services, who “prize their distinctiveness and the freedom to choose their own equipment”.

The department rushed the start of the project, failing to follow proper procedures, the report says. Ineffective checks and balances during the early stages meant a commitment to the project on the basis of “broad-brush and inaccurate estimates” of costs and benefits and an unrealistic delivery timetable. DCLG under-appreciated the project's complexity, and then mismanaged the IT contractor's performance and delivery. It failed to provide the necessary leadership, over-relying on poorly managed consultants and failing to sort out early problems with delivery by the contractor.

The report warns that the future cost of regional control centres is likely to remain high because of the longterm leases agreed with developers. DCLG should mitigate the losses of the programme by encouraging local fire and rescue services to use the regional control centres, or by exploring demand for them from other public and private sector bodies.

But the report adds that DCLG should still try to achieve the original project objectives of resilience and efficiency, but as a new programme with clear objectives, lines of reporting and governance.

"This is yet another example of a government IT project taking on a life of its own, absorbing ever-increasing resources without reaching its objectives,” said Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office (NAO).

“The rationale and benefits of a regional approach were unclear and badly communicated to locally accountable fire and rescue services, who remained unconvinced. Essential checks and balances in the early stages of the project were ineffective. It was approved on the basis of unrealistic estimates of costs and under-appreciation of the complexity of the IT involved and the project was hurriedly implemented and poorly managed.”

Commenting on the report, a DCLG spokesperson said:

"We accept the findings of the NAO report and acknowledge that the FireControl project had serious failings rooted in its 2004 initiation and subsequent execution. However, we welcome the NAO's acknowledgement that from early 2009 the department took a firm grip on the project and we have already taken significant steps to improve its project procurement, management and scrutiny skills and processes.

"We will consider the recommendations carefully and identify where we can strengthen procedures further. The appointment of a chief fire and rescue adviser from the sector in 2007 strengthened professional input to fire and rescue policy and are now working with the fire and rescue sector to deliver a new strategy for national resilience built on local solutions. Funding has been set aside so that this can be achieved."

The Failure of the FireControl Project:
Executive summary
Read the full report