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Case study - Large industrial fire with molten glass hazard

27 May 2010

Fire crews attending a large fire at a glass factory were faced 400 tonnes of molten glass on two floors, reaching temperatures of 1600 degrees C. Eion Doyle of Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service sets out the measures needed to effectively fight the fire while providing firefighter safety.

Fire engines at incident

49 appliances and vehicles attended the fire

Northern Ireland Fire & Rescue Service (NIFRS) received a call at 8.59pm on Saturday 5 December 2009 to attend an incident at Quinn Glass, a manufacturer of glass containers, in Derrylin, Co Fermanagh.

The fire, which started accidentally in a ruptured glass furnace, resulted in approximately 400 tonnes of molten glass causing the fire over two floors of the building.

Over the 11 hour duration of the incident, a total of 49 appliances and vehicles from across Counties Tyrone, Armagh, Down and Fermanagh attended the incident including, 24 pumping appliances, six special appliances and officers. In addition to this, two appliances from County Cavan in the Republic of Ireland were also in attendance.

Four factory workers, who had tried to control the outbreak prior to the arrival of fire crews, were taken to hospital for treatment for smoke inhalation.

Hazards to firefighters
This incident involved a furnace inside the factory complex which had been identified as a lower tier COMAH site in accordance with the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations. The building comprised of a Light Insulated Sandwich Panel (LISP) construction which posed an extra concern for fire crews.

On arrival the first crews were informed that a rupture had occurred in one of two glass furnaces which operate inside the factory. This rupture was causing approximately 400 tonnes of molten glass to leak out from the furnace at temperatures in the region of 1600OC.

Due to the nature of the glass production, manufacturing continued in another area of the factory in order to manage the output from the second furnace that was operating normally.

In order to prevent the fire spreading to other parts of the factory, a large volume of water would be required to cool the molten glass. Eight firefighting jets were used for almost 10 hours to cool this glass and create a seal on the ruptured furnace. These were supported by three water tankers during the operation.

The large amount of water being used to cool the molten glass created huge volumes of steam within the factory. Due to the intensity of the heat and the irrespirable atmosphere, firefighters required Breathing Apparatus (BA) and in total, 90 cylinders of compressed air were used.

BA precautions
The BA teams accessed the building through three entry points – two on the ground floor and one on the first floor. This required the use of BA main control. Two BA main guidelines with branch lines were introduced to underpin the firefighter safety arrangements in place. The BA crews were relieved regularly because of the punishing conditions that they were facing.

NIFRS has recently introduced a standard operating procedure for firefighter emergencies and the Fire Assist and Search Team (FAST) were mobilised to support the large number of firefighters wearing BA.

Firefighter safety was a high priority for the duration of the incident and a number of measures were introduced by the incident commander. These included dynamic risk assessment, use of BA guidelines and branch lines, use of safety officers in each command sector, Level 3 incident command, strategic deployment of BA FAST, and the strategic reserve of four pumps were ordered on into the area because of its remote location.

Knowledge of the site
There is no doubt that this incident was a challenge for fire crews to deal with. The noise alone in the factory combined with the heat and the intensity of the fire, aggravated by the darkness inside the factory, presented a challenge for communication between firefighters. Furthermore, due to the remote location of the factory, mobile phone signals and radio communications were hampered.
 

Arial shot of Quinn Glass

The fire service was familiar with the site because of previous visits

However, the information gained by NIFRS personnel having visited the site prior to this incident in accordance with operational intelligence procedures, had been extremely significant. An operational risk card had been prepared for the plant and all local crews who attended the initial response had already been on a risk visit to the plant. This knowledge was invaluable for the initial turn out as they began to develop operational tactics for the incident.

In addition, the information given by factory staff to the first attending fire crews on arrival at the incident was excellent. The command support unit had been located in a position that allowed a clear view southwards allowing “Sat Comms” to be obtained, which in turn provided a connection to web based information including aerial photography, weather, and a fire-ground plan to the command room. This, combined with the resources that NIFRS committed to the incident ensured that an effective tactical plan could be put in place and that the incident was dealt with as safely and efficiently as possible.

Adrian Curry, chief executive Quinn Glass praised the work of fire crews at the scene. He told us: "The professionalism exhibited by the fire crews who attended the furnace leak at our glass container plant could only be described as exemplary. Due to their efforts the damage was minimised, thus securing 400 jobs. I offer my sincere thanks to all involved."

Eion Doyle is western area commander of Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service


 


     
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