In the light of the Lakanal House tragedy, are high rise residential blocks inherently less safe in a fire than their low-rise equivalents? Not if all design, construction, management and maintenance measures work as they should do, says Malcolm Kelly.

High-rise dwellings have been designed to a specification that recognises the need for special fire safety measures

Prior to July 2009. high rise dwellings had a low profile in the sense of their perceived risk from fire. Fire authorities, still testing the scope and limitations of the Fire Safety Order probably thought, with some justification, that they had riskier operators to pursue than the local authorities, ALMOs (Arms-length management organisations) and housing trusts variously responsible for fire safety in much of the UK’s high rise housing stock. After all, the Fire Safety Order would only reach as far as the common areas of such premises, and the observable problems in high rise blocks were seen to emanate from behind the front doors of the individual flats and maisonettes.

The reality check started with the events of 3 July 2009 when six people lost their lives in Lakanal House, in a fire that didn’t behave in the contained and manageable way that theory, design and experience predicted it should. Current indications are that the “why” and “how” of this fire’s behaviour will be made public later this year, with the full picture of events possibly not emerging until the completion of the inquest – perhaps as late as 2011. So while they await the findings of due process in the Lakanal House case, the owners and landlords of high rise dwellings and their many thousands of tenants and private leaseholders have time to speculate and take stock of the fire safety of these buildings. What evidence could they look at and what might their conclusions be?

To “take stock of fire safety” is another way of saying “carry out a fire risk assessment.”

The real issue is: What are the consequences for people escaping from a dwelling fire if that dwelling is on a high floor of a block of flats, and what are the consequences for people in other flats next door to, or on the same floor or indeed on other floors of the building? Whereas few people in a Coronation Street-style terrace would lose much sleep over the risk of their neighbour’s house catching fire, those on the upper floors of a high rise block might now be troubled about the risks from fire spread and their ability to escape to ground level.

In an ideal world those worries should be unfounded. From when they started, , to be built in the UK in significant numbers in the early 1960s, high-rise dwellings have been designed to a specification that recognises the need for special fire safety measures to contain fire in its compartment of origin – normally a flat or maisonette; provides ffective means of escape to ground level; and providesmeasures to assist the fire service in dealing with an outbreak of fire on a high floor. These design standards have evolved over time and generally, but not without exception, have become more stringent. But their general purpose has always been that an outbreak of fire in a dwelling can be contained in that dwelling for long enough for the fire service to be summoned, arrive, locate and deal with the outbreak.

Stay put
This fire management model gives rise to the terms 'stay-put' or 'defend in place' which is explained in British Standard 5588:1 as follows: “Owing to the high degree of compartmentation provided in blocks of flats and / or maisonettes, the spread of fire from one dwelling to another is unusual. It is, therefore, no longer assumed that – in the event of fire – it is necessary to evacuate the whole building, whole floors or even dwellings adjacent to the fire”. Building Regulations Approved Document B sets out the same assumptions.

However, in the real world, the higher the building, the higher is the cost of providing and maintaining appropriate fire protection systems – disproportionately so (for example, fire compartment ratings increase from 60 minutes to 120 minutes as buildings increase in height; buildings over 18m will require a dry riser installation, those over 60 m will require a more costly wet riser system; residential blocks over 30m are now required to be sprinklered).Over time, interference and misuse erodes the effectiveness of fire safety systems. Standards evolve to match changing risks and older fire safety systems become outdated and potentially substandard.

Prior to the addition of Regulation 16B to the Building Regulations, building maintenance records got lost or neglected and now, when the need or opportunity arises to make repairs, it is often difficult to determine what exactly needs to be repaired, replaced or updated. All these issues chip away at the integrity of fire safety provisions in the high rise dwelling where a ’stay-put‘ or ’defend in place‘ strategy ought to be viable.

In an ideal world all 'responsible persons' or the agencies they represent would carry out an iterative cycle of fire risk assessments as required by law under the Fire Safety Order, and would be on top of these issues. But back in the real world the media exposure following Lakanal House revealed (not always accurately) that many high rise dwelling blocks had not had risk assessments carried out. In other words, prior to the Lakanal House incident many of the owners, managers and landlords of high rise dwellings could not demonstrate that they had been taking stock of fire safety. But that situation has no doubt changed.

Naming and shaming
The media’s naming and shaming exercise may inadvertently have left the impression that doing a risk assessment was the be all and end all of compliance with the Fire Safety Order, whereas of course, it is only the start. And while complying with the law is generally to be recommended it is fulfilling the spirit or intention of the law that, in this case at least, is even more important. The outcome everyone wants – tenants, leaseholders, owners and landlords and the law alike – is a safe building.

Starting then with the risk assessment – should the responsible person do it themselves, delegate someone who (might) know what they are doing, or employ someone purporting to be a qualified expert? If the risk assessment is not fully and competently carried out (or 'suitable and sufficient' as the Fire Safety Order requires) then there is little chance of addressing the right risks in the right order in the most cost effective way. There are schemes for third party accreditation designed to allow the registered fire risk assessor to demonstrate competence, but their uptake is limited and purely voluntary. Currently those responsible persons commissioning risk assessment work have little to guide them towards a reliable choice of risk assessor. There now seem to be plans afoot to address this shortfall but that’s a topic for another article.

Assuming the responsible person gets a suitable and sufficient risk assessment carried out, she/he now needs to convert it into an action plan to deal with the recorded risks. Here the Fire Safety Order requires the responsible person to appoint a ‘competent person’ to implement the necessary fire safety measures, but again, finding 'proof' of relevant competence can be difficult. The action plan should seek to deal with the risks in order of perceived priority and with proportionate effort and expenditure – that is the higher the risk the more urgent the solution and the greater the justifiable cost. The introduction of costs, budgets, and accounts departments into the process brings the ideal world face to face with the material world, and herein lies temptation for the responsible person struggling to manage down risk within tight budgetary constraints – which probably includes just about everyone.

Repair or replace?
If the building is 20 or 30 years old or more, it will probably have been designed and built in the light of standards that are now outdated. The original fire protection measures may have fallen into disrepair or been simply lost through intervening alteration work and general interference. So does the responsible person make repairs to the original standard, or take the opportunity to upgrade to current recommended standards? The latter option might be more expensive in terms of up-front cost but a closer look might reveal a different financial picture in the medium to long term. The responsible person might also want to bear in mind that the Fire Safety Order and Building Regulations part B seek to protect people from fire. The responsible person might, however, want to add to that minimum level of fire safety in order to protect a building from being severely or irreparably damaged by fire – an approach which the residents and insurance underwriters would no doubt applaud.

Older blocks of flats will have fire doors that are unlikely to pass a modern BS 476:22 test

A common component of most fire protection plans that illustrates both these issues is the ubiquitous fire door. Older blocks of flats will have fire doors that are unlikely to pass a modern BS 476:22 test. They might have been assessed as likely to provide 30 minutes' fire resistance, but that will be someone’s professional judgement, the risk assessor’s probably. The old doors are unlikely to have intumescent strips or cold smoke seals. They won’t hold back smoke. They may indeed check fire for 30 minutes or then again maybe only 10 minutes. No one knows for sure until the fire happens – frankly it’s informed guess work.

A fire door refurbishment programme may save money up-front by replacing just the door leaves and installing intumescent strips and cold smoke seals. Of course this will be done against an assessment of the ventilation systems in the building and their ability to adequately disburse or dilute any smoke that might compromise means of escape.

False economy?
However before choosing this course the responsible person might want to consider three questions. Firstly, how frequently will the doors need further repair or replacement over their lifetime and what will be the cost of each repair? Secondly, will the fire doors fixed as front entrance doors to dwellings meet the security concerns of the residents or will additional work and expenditure be required to address the perceived risks of intrusion, assault and anti-social behaviour. Thirdly, and most importantly, if a fire occurs will the competent assessor’s guess (sorry, ‘professional judgment’) prove reliable or will the ’30 minute‘ door fail in 20 minutes, 10 minutes, or less?

Of course, if someone dies or is injured in the fire, the financial savings argument for the implemented fire safety plan will become fair game for any legal or criminal proceedings that might follow, and the courts will decide what was reasonable in the circumstances. But even without human loss, what will be the effect of a poorly contained fire on the fabric of the building? How much more extensive will fire and smoke damage be? How much greater the cost of clean-up and repair?

The probability of incurring any or all of these additional or deferred costs will be substantially reduced if the responsible person opts to install tested and certified FD30S or FD60S fire doorsets, and chooses a doorset that has been designed to resist vandalism and be easily repairable; or in the case of dwelling entrance doors has an approved security and safe escape rating. The latter includes locking systems tested to BS8621:2007 permitting immediate means of egress when necessary whilst not compromising the level of security, or for ground floor properties with alternative means of escape, locking systems to BS10621:2007 as required by Secured by Design and NHBC. The certified fire and the smoke stopping performance will make fire and smoke containment more reliable and as well as improving safety, and will reduce the extent and severity of damage in the event of fire. The same or similar arguments will apply to other aspects and components of the building’s fire protection systems. False economy equals a false sense of security equals trouble and expense in store. That’s why the quality of advice at both risk assessment and implementation stage is vitally important.

Having secured the material aspects of the fire safety plan, the responsible person must ensure that the plan is managed forever thereafter (or at least until the duty passes to another). That means attending repeatedly and persistently to the fire safety education of the residents and tenants – are their homes safe from fire and do they know what to do in the event of fire in their own home or a neighbour’s? It means ensuring that fire safety policies, such as regular refuse removal, are understood and applied. It means ensuring maintenance and upkeep of the physical fire protection and firefighting systems. It means going back to the risk assessment again and again to check its relevance.

So to conclude; in the light of the Lakanal House fire are high rise dwelling safe? Well, if residents look to their own fire safety within their own flat or maisonette, become familiar with the fire protection systems in their building, understand how they operate and respect and look after them; and if the landlord, owners and managers (aka the responsible persons) fulfil their legal duty and ensure that risk assessments are regularly and competently carried out and competently acted on with a view to longer term sustainability; and if proper fire safety systems and components are specified, properly installed and maintained then yes – high rise dwellings are safe – but that amounts to a lot of ‘ifs’.

Malcolm Kelly is an independent consultant on fire safety and fire service issues and was assistant commissioner and head of fire safety at London Fire Brigade from 2001 to 2005. He also carries out consultancy and training work on behalf of Gerda, including a one-day workshop on awareness of fire risk assessment issues for managers of blocks of flats.